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Abstract 
This paper explores the nature of the co-called „private equity business model‟ (PEBM) and 
assesses its shortcomings, using the illustrative example of the role of private equity in 
structuring the finance and subsequent collapse of MG Rover, as the automotive industry 
has been a significant destination for private equity financing. The paper outlines the nature 
of the PEBM. It then details how the PEBM extracts value, before stressing how this can 
affect workers in a portfolio business. We argue that the emergence of the PEBM changes 
the basis of competitive rules in organisations and the running of erstwhile going concerns; 
necessitating a need for further regulation - particularly, how to secure wider stakeholder 
oversight without reducing the efficiency of PEBM concerns.  
Keywords 
Private equity business model, automotive sector, corporate governance, economic 
restructuring 
JEL codes 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past ten years has witnessed significant growth in company buy-outs by private equity 
funds; many of them on the “public2private” model, otherwise termed the private equity 
business model (PEBM) which increases the ratio of debt-to-equity, giving rise to the term 
“leverage buy-outs” (LBO). The aim of private equity acquisition, whether in the form of a 
buy-in to an existing private business or a public2private deal, is to unlock value for investors 
and the fund managers themselves.  
Public2private deals and the PEBM do this by the deployment of a business model that is 
principally financed through debt and financial engineering, that is, leverage secured against 
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company assets such as freehold property and pension schemes. Acquisitions supported by 
the PEBM represent up to 30% of all private equity acquisitions in the UK and across the EU 
buy-outs of existing businesses account for 70% of all private equity investment, (PSE, 
2007:45, WEF, 2008::viii; Gilligan and Wright, 2008:14; Ernst & Young, 2008:7). Some 70% 
of all funds are used simply to buy established businesses and just 5% of private equity 
funds are channelled into venture capital (Froud and Williams, 2007: 406).  
In turn, since 2006 these deals have stimulated considerable debate and controversy over 
their potential impact on the health of firms and employees - particularly in the current 
recessionary economic climate brought about by the credit crunch (FSA, 2006; Clark, 2007; 
2009b; House of Commons, 2007; GAO, 2008). Indeed, the role of private equity has been 
brought into sharp critical focus in the context of high-profile company collapses and 
subsequent closures - for example Woolworths, with the loss of some 30,000 jobs last year; 
and also MG Rover, the focus of this paper. Closure in turn highlights the uneven nature of 
the consequent socio-spatial impacts on host regions, with the closure of MGR in February 
2005 having had a significant impact on the wider West Midlands economy; as the firm‟s 
turnover accounted for 0.5 to 1 percent of regional GDP, with £200 million a year alone in 
government revenue foregone, in addition to multiplier effects within the supply chain (Bailey 
and Kobayashi, 2008). 
In this paper, we explore the role of the private equity business model in structuring the 
finance and subsequent collapse of MGR. In particular, we consider how the rise of private 
equity financing as a phenomenon is symptomatic of an unregulated capitalism which has 
served to further entrench existing patterns of inequality and uneven development across 
regions. In common with many sectors, the automotive industry has been a significant 
destination for private equity financing, especially in the supply chain, where a private equity 
„gold rush‟ has been noted (KPMG, 2008). Yet the MG Rover case is unusual in that the 
„Phoenix Four‟ each invested only £60,000 in a special purpose investment vehicle called 
„Techtronic‟ to secure the MG Rover deal, with low/no cost debt funding in effect coming from 
BMW. In turn, the role of the Phoenix Four has come under critical scrutiny, since the 
publication of a Department of Business Innovation and Skills Report on the collapse of MGR 
(BIS, 2009). As such, it is evident that workers often end up being the last in the queue of 
creditors to be awarded entitlements when a company goes into liquidation, which in turn 
imposes real costs on them amidst a context of job loss. Indeed, it is MG Rover workers and 
their families who have experienced significant costs associated with the closure and as 
such, the human toll of the firm's collapse has been profound, as we detail below.  
As a theoretically informed yet empirically underpinned contribution to the debate, using 
MGR as an illustrative case, this study addresses three related research questions. First, 
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what is the private equity business model (PEBM) and within this how are owner-investor 
interests positioned within this model? Second, how does the PEBM extract value from 
businesses? Third, how can this affect the interests of workers in a portfolio business? In so 
doing, the paper is structured into four substantive parts. This introduction is followed by 
details of the research methods utilised in this study. Part two of the paper outlines the 
theoretical framework of private equity, value extraction and direct ownership interests. Part 
three reports on the deployment of the PEBM in the so-called re-structuring of MGR after its 
sale by BMW in 2000 and its insolvency in 2005 - one of the less visible public2private PEBM 
deals in the UK. This is followed by a critically based discussion and conclusion which 
outlines the unregulated nature of private equity in the UK and the impact that this may have 
on business and workers.  
This paper uses a meta-review research method which draws together material from distinct 
projects on which the authors‟ have recently been engaged and refers to a systematic 
evaluation of existing studies, both theoretical and empirical, supported by primary data 
collection from publicly available sources in the private equity sector, interviews with market 
experts and primary case study, interviews and documentary research. It also details the 
findings of an 18 month ESRC funded study into the impact of the MG Rover closure on 
workers, their families and communities.1  In so doing, we are able to produce a detailed 
case study of the application of the PEBM in the re-structuring of what was then, the sole UK 
based and owned volume car producer.  The primary source material for much of part three 
of the paper comes from a forensic analysis of the department of Business report into the 
Affairs of Phoenix Venture Holdings and the MGR group (BIS, 2009). In summary, the paper 
presents a critically focussed yet empirically informed theoretically reasoned evaluation of 
economic and ownership re-structuring in MGR based on the application of the PEBM. 
 
THE PRIVATE EQUITY BUSINESS MODEL AND OWNER-INVESTOR INTERESTS 
Private Equity and the Private Equity Business Model 
Private equity is capital raised for the specific purpose of investing directly in companies in 
one of two ways. The first route is indirectly, i.e. not in the direct purchase of shares in a 
particular firm but rather a commitment of capital to a particular private equity fund for a 
number of years. It is then the private equity fund which invests in (what become) portfolio 
firms on behalf of their investors. Secondly, and alternatively, a group of potential investors 
can create a special purpose investment vehicle (SIV) which in turns invests in a particular 
firm. Investments are actively managed by listed (publicly quoted) fund management 
companies or limited partnerships which may control numerous funds. In either form of buy-
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out investment (direct or indirect), bespoke investment vehicles for defined projects are the 
favoured mechanism for the PEBM because they have no legal or taxable personality and 
individual partners operate collectively. Therefore, fund managers or investors (managing 
partners) who create the investment vehicle and investors in the vehicle (the limited partners 
– these two groups can be the same people) are taxed as individuals.  
The term „private equity‟ can be used inclusively to describe buy-outs funded from any 
source - or alternatively the term can be used exclusively to segment venture capital and 
mid-market buy-outs of private firms from those investors which specialise in the PEBM. 
Whilst recognising the inclusiveness of the wider approach, this paper focuses on the PEBM 
which is designed to re-structure established firms. Therein acquisition of listed firms, such 
as the MGR Group, is secured by buying a controlling percentage of shares with the aim of 
„re-structuring‟ the firm and securing a return on investment by selling the firm in three to five 
years. Once a partnership has control of all the shares in a portfolio company it becomes the 
single shareholder and the firm is no longer a publicly listed company; it is effectively „taken 
private‟.  
Once controlled by private equity, firms respond to demands for legitimacy with key 
stakeholders – namely, investors and shareholders. In the contemporary period managers 
are either compelled or actively encouraged to adopt structures which are in the interests of 
these stakeholders. For example, meaningful analysis of the longer term prospects of the 
portfolio firm and the quality of jobs and employment relations will be contingent on first 
evaluating the strategic intent of private equity owners and the manner in which they deploy 
the PEBM post-acquisition in terms of organizational choices. Whilst the efficiency gains that 
deployment of the PEBM aims to secure in portfolio firms are expected to encourage 
restructuring towards a minimalist organization, in reality the form this takes is dependent on 
whether strategy is oriented towards extracting short-term value from acquired assets or 
renewing and developing such assets (Rodrigues and Child, 2010).  Empirically, findings are 
mixed. Some commentators argue that this supposed „new capitalism‟ exhibits a strategy of 
value extraction wherein efficiency is focussed on downsizing the existing scale and scope of 
assets and commitments to existing stakeholders including labour (Clark – forthcoming; 
Froud and Williams, 2007; Thornton, 2007). In contrast, others suggest that private equity 
ownership exhibits a strategy of value-renewal where the injection of cash can overcome the 
limitations of previous ownership often in the direction of resource-based approaches to 
managing the firm and its human resources (Bacon et al., 2010). We argue that the MG 
Rover case falls firmly into the first camp of value extraction given (a) the amounts taken out 
of the firm in one form or another by elite owners despite (b) the firm‟s losses and ultimate 
collapse. The latter came as little surprise given that the opportunities for value creation and 
 5 
renewal were extremely limited if not impossible in this case; indeed at the time of the 
Phoenix take-over the firm was „virtually dead on its feet‟ (Bailey et al., 2008). 
Financialization and Investor-Owner Interests    
„Financialization‟ refers to structural change in capitalist economies wherein the role of 
finance capital comes to dominate economic and financial activity beyond financial markets 
in the operation of national business systems, (Clark, 2009b; Dore, 2008; Epstein, 2005: 3).  
Business systems subject to light touch or substantive regulation of stakeholder interests are 
disrupted, disembodied and re-shaped by financialization in three ways. Firstly, there is the 
ability of investors to secure returns unrelated to the production or supply process and the 
longer term running of a firm (Soros, 2008). For example, under the PEBM acquisitions are 
termed „portfolio firms‟ thereby reifying the idea of an investment portfolio to erstwhile firms 
which supply goods and services, employ labour and perhaps dominate the local economy. 
These characteristics and the interests of stakeholders within them are of far less 
significance than the investor-owner interests of those who fund these acquisitions. Secondly 
- and directly related, financial demands increasingly dictate the behaviour of firms and 
change the basis of competitive rules. This development is captured theoretically in the 
argument that employers find it more difficult (even if they so intend) to keep their side of the 
bargain as a result of developments or opportunities in the financial circuit of capital. For 
example, at the firm level resource-based approaches to the firm are currently in vogue as a 
stake-holding model of leadership. However, at the business system level investor and 
shareholder interests may override these approaches, as firms governed by the PEBM seek 
to secure investment returns as quickly as possible (Thompson, 2003; Clark, 2009b). 
Finally, in a global system, financialization opens up external and methodologically 
innovative - if alien - sources of funding, which firms may turn to in order to remain a viable, 
ongoing concern. Financial instruments such as off balance sheet investment vehicles are 
often owned or funded by private equity funds registered in banking and fiscal territories in 
the UK but beyond the jurisdiction of Great Britain; for example, the Isle of Man or the 
Channel Islands. A dialectic is present within this process as firms culturally and 
institutionally embedded in a particular region of a country of origin may no longer be wholly 
owned, managed and controlled in that territory. For example, in the UK, many premier 
league football teams are no longer British firms but rather are wholly owned subsidiaries of 
American sports franchises managed on the basis of the PEBM. 
The Private Equity Sector, the PEBM and the Extraction of Value for Investors   
The private equity sector is an asset class which raises capital from investors who commit 
monies to a private equity fund for a period of ten years. Fund managers invest in 
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organizations (which become) portfolio firms on behalf of investors. The sector has three 
segments; venture capital, mid-market buy-outs of private firms, and funds which specialise 
in taking listed firms private via the PEBM. The term „private equity‟ can be used inclusively 
to describe buy-outs funded from any source or alternatively the term can be used to 
segment venture capital and mid-market buy-outs of private firms or orphaned corporate 
divisions from those partnerships which specialise in the PEBM. So whilst recognising the 
inclusiveness of the wider approach, this paper focuses on public2private deals or the PEBM 
which is designed to re-structure established firms. Here private equity partnerships acquire 
a controlling stake in listed firms on a publicly quoted stock market. Once a partnership has 
majority control of the shares in a portfolio company it becomes the dominant shareholder 
and shares may no longer be traded.  
The PEBM is wholly distinguishable from venture capital and mid-market buy-outs as in the 
main these segments do not rely heavily on leverage debt to support acquisitions (Gilligan 
and Wright, 2008). The PEBM structures the control of businesses where investors in a fund 
and the partners overseeing the PEBM are wholly separate, both operationally and 
contractually from the portfolio firm. The justification for concentrating on the PEBM as used 
by larger private equity funds is threefold. One, although the term „private equity‟ covers 
providers of venture and start-up capital and providers of „mid-market‟ capital both groups 
stress that they provide equity capital which is not underwritten by leveraged debt.  Two, 
notwithstanding this distinction, many academic studies of private equity aggregate different 
types of buy-out and the different components of the private equity sector (Thornton, 2007; 
Watt, 2008).  
Three, in addition to this, aggregation conflates and mixes-up different types of management 
buy-out, for example, outside buy-ins and buy-outs some of which are and are not private 
equity backed on the PEBM (Bacon, et al., 2008; Wood and Wright, 2009). This conflation 
has led many venture capital and mid-market practitioners to seek to differentiate themselves 
from larger funds which concentrate on highly leveraged buy-outs on the PEBM (Rip, 2009).  
What results from this is twofold. First, it is important to recognize that the PEBM as defined 
and described herein refers to a specific portion of the private equity sector applicable to re-
structuring established, often, listed firms. Second, PEBM came to prominence during the 
period 2005-2009 when benign economic conditions (low interest rates, rising equity values 
and rising property values) underpinned the model. However, as economic conditions 
reversed highly leveraged use of the PEBM became far less viable to the extent that the 
model and the sector experienced „distressed conditions‟ from early 2009 onwards. Here 
many portfolio firms were worth less than the loans which supported them and the sector 
even where it deployed the PEBM showed a preference for all cash deals often in „fire sale‟ 
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conditions. Thus, even within one small portion of the sector the dynamics of the real 
economy mean that it is not possible to refer to any business model as a fixed feature 
because practices will change and develop as the real economy changes (Harner, 2008).         
The aim of private equity acquisition, whether in the form of a buy-in to an existing private 
business (or if a plc business is taken private either directly by investors or indirectly by a 
private equity fund) is to “unlock value” for investors and the fund managers themselves. The 
“take private” variant does this by the deployment of a business model that is principally 
financed through debt and financial engineering involving the divestment of company assets; 
for example, leverage or revenue streams secured against company assets such as freehold 
property and pension schemes. The PEBM can secure up to 90% of a buyout leaving the 
fund and its managers to put in only a small percentage themselves. 
Whilst some contributors to the debate on the effects of private equity on portfolio firms 
provide evidence of a bias towards renewal of firms (Bacon et al., 2010), there are several 
sources of value extraction associated with investor-owner interests that could actually inhibit 
longer term renewal of a portfolio firm. First, consider downsizing and redundancy. Here, 
private equity firms typically view portfolio companies as a bundle of assets which can be 
disintegrated, downsized and separated for short-term gains, not as an integrated business 
which provides a service or supplies goods. For example, at the AA and Northern Rock (two 
firms re-structured on the PEBM), the new owners laid off a third of the existing workforce 
(see Clark, forthcoming). Second - and specifically related to the above, management could 
focus on short-term profits by unlocking valuable assets through sophisticated financial 
engineering to generate a “freer cash flow” via divestments of wholly owned assets or the 
sale and lease-back of such assets, principally property portfolios. This drives management 
re-structuring and unbundling prior to an “exit strategy” that aims to realize an investment 
after perhaps only five years.  
Third (prior to the current global financial downturn), private equity owners were able to “flip” 
a portfolio company (or parts of it) within a very short period of time to take profits - leaving a 
new owner to extract value from the portion of the portfolio business they acquired. For 
example, many private equity owners sell-on the pension scheme of a portfolio company in 
the secondary private equity market, managing „employer‟ contributions to it on a contractual 
basis which may, or may not, include a pension payment holiday. This method of value 
extraction has significant implications for workers if a portfolio firm becomes insolvent or if it 
is transferred to a loss making subsidiary of its “owners”. In 2008, 23% of the pension 
schemes in assessment for possible rescue by the UK Government‟s Pension Protection 
Fund were owned by private equity. This is a disproportionately large figure as private equity 
backed firms across the UK only account for around 10% of the private sector employed 
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labour force (Close Brothers, 2008). Finally, owner-investors may consciously create an 
internal web of firms and owner-investor vehicle employee trusts within an initial investment 
with the aim of extracting value in remuneration in the most tax efficient manner. An example 
of how this might work is detailed in Box 1. 
 
Box 1. The A, B, C of Re-Structuring in the PEBM 
1, Investors A want to buy firm B. 
2, A creates an investment vehicle called Car. Car is funded by loans which are turned into 
equity.  
3, Car buys company B. Car becomes the shareholder of B taking the firm private. Car pays 
its investors - the new owner-managers of B, that is A, a salary and a bonus.  
4, Car loans B funds at commercial rates, these loans are eventually re-paid to Car (a legal 
entity by B, that is, to A the individuals (the ultimate beneficiaries) who own B via Car.  
5, Car creates an off-shore investment trust called D for its employees and families outside 
GB territory and pays money into this trust as it secures revenue, its only employees are A. 
Car also sells and leases back B land and property transferring some of the revenue streams 
from this D.  
6, Car also set up a property vehicle E to manage the land sale which is owned by A. A 
secures a commission for this work. A and Car are the same but the firm and investment 
vehicle are contractually, legally and hermetically sealed from one another.  
7, A deposits the commission in a parallel employee trust F in the same territory as D.  
8, B sells some subsidiary operations at historic cost to G.  G is owned by Car +1 other.  
9, G sells the subsidiary at market value on the open market, the revenue accrues to Car, 
Car deposits the revenue stream from this in D.  
10, The individuals who make up A who created Car and own B and who are the trustees of 
D and E and F and G are either paid a fee or a salary by all of these entities.           
 
THE PEBM AND RE-STRUCTURING AT MG ROVER, 2000-2005 
It should be stressed that the schema described in section 2 and Box 1 above is both lawful 
and textbook in its presentation of the PEBM and the creation of special single purpose 
investment vehicles and off-shore employee-owner-investor trusts. Indeed, as the critically 
informed chronological narrative contained in this section demonstrates, none of the actions 
undertaken in the re-structuring process at MGR was unlawful. The extraction of value for 
investors is a regular feature of the PEBM. However, what this case demonstrates is how the 
business model is undermined if the re-structuring process fails, that is, if investor-owners 
cannot re-invigorate the product via a joint venture or injection of new capital and or – critically 
in the MG Rover case - sell-on the business via an initial offering of shares or via the 
secondary private equity market. This was always going to be difficult if not impossible at 
MGR, and yet it did not prevent an (at the time unaccountable) value-extraction process. The 
value extracted in one way or another (some £77 million was taken out of MGR in one form or 
another) would not have been enough to save the firm in mass production guise but if used 
differently might have helped to bring a key mid-sized car to market and bought more time for 
a deal with Chinese partners that preserved some activities at Longbridge.   
 9 
BMW’s Divestment of MG Rover and its Subsequent Re-Structuring: The Narrative. 
All of the material in this section is based on publically available information. Phoenix 
members have repeatedly stated (as we do) that they have done nothing unlawful in their 
attempt to re-structure MGR. The main reference source cited in this section of the paper is 
the department of Business Innovation and Skills Report (BIS, 2009). In 2000 MGR was a 
wholly-owned British subsidiary of the German car manufacturer BMW, the latter having 
acquired the (then profitable) Rover Group from British Aerospace in 1994 after the collapse 
of the latter‟s regional jet business and need for cash (Bailey et al., 2008).  
In the spring of 2000, BMW announced publicly that it was in negotiation with a British private 
equity partnership - Alchemy partners - to sell MGR. At this date private equity and the PEBM 
were little known or understood other than that many had significant asset-stripping 
credentials. Fearing that MGR would be slimmed down to become a specialist non-volume 
producer, by Easter 2000 a Birmingham-based campaign of opposition to the Alchemy bid 
was underway culminating in a March for Rover in Birmingham on April 1st. At the same time 
four local businessmen were laying the plans for what became Phoenix Venture Holdings 
which was also bidding to acquire MGR. In May 2000 BMW accepted a bid from the Phoenix 
Consortium (A) to acquire MGR (B) through a special purpose equity-investment vehicle 
called Techtronic (Car). The four members of the Phoenix consortium each invested £60,000 
in Techtronic shortly before it acquired MGR. In return they each received 60,000 ordinary 
shares in Techtronic.  BMW was so keen to offload what became MGR that it sold the firm for 
a token £10. Moreover, in so doing BMW handed over £400 million in cash to be paid back in 
periodic instalments, plus £75 million in the form of loan notes in lieu of warranties and 
unsettled liabilities plus a stock of cars worth around another £400 million (BIS, 2009: 750).  
BMW‟s divestment of MGR was completed on May 9th 2000 and BMW paid the first instalment 
of the £400 million to MGR‟s new owners Techtronic. In December a new entity Phoenix 
Venture Holdings (PVH) (Car) acquired the 240,000 shares held in Techtronic (Car) by the 
four individuals (A) often referred to as the „Phoenix 4‟. In return for these shares the four 
individuals acquire „D‟ voting shares in PVH plus £10 million in loan notes. Other stakeholders 
in MGR, employees, car dealers and management team members received other non-voting 
shares. The four individuals (A), plus one other person, owned the controlling, that is, voting 
interest in PVH (Car), this is 40% of the total share capital (FRRP, 2005: 24). At the same 
time as this, the MGR board agreed to pay interest on any loans that it receives from 
Techtronic. So, in summary and to be clear, Techtronic is not liable to pay any interest on the 
monies it was gifted/loaned by BMW but charged interest on money it lent to MGR. This move 
generated a revenue stream for Techtronic which, if it returned profits, would enable it to pay a 
dividend to PVH. Techtronic owned MGR; Techtronic was in turn owned by PVH; whose 
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controlling owners via the „D‟ shares were the four individuals known as the Phoenix 4. These 
revenue streams between Techtronic and PVH were fully insulated from the operations of 
MGR which made losses in most years. Between 2001 and December 2003 MGR incurred 
operating losses of £340 million and draft figures for 2004 indicated an operating loss of £118 
million.  
In addition to re-structuring ownership of the operating business between 2001 and 2002 the 
MGR property portfolio was re-structured by PVH. At the end of 2001 the Longbridge site was 
transferred to MGR „property holdings‟ (E), a subsidiary of PVH. Other transfers involved a 
parts business, XPart, the titles to dealer properties and those companies which owned the 
rights to historic names within MGR. The transfer of the Longbridge site from PVH (Car) to E 
was performed at the net book value of the site in December 2001; this amounted to £36.6 
million (BIS, 2009: 258). However, between April 2003 and December 2003 MGR property 
holdings (E) sold the site for its market value of nearly £60 million. The market value of the 
site in 2001 was £43 million (ibid. 262). Most of the Longbridge land was leased back to PVH 
not MGR via property holdings at a cost of around £4 million per year. As the BIS report 
makes clear the revenues derived from the sale of Longbridge were used by MGR, yet 
irrespective of this when MGR became insolvent in 2005 it no longer owned an asset (the sale 
of which was underpriced). The costs to MGR included the annual leasing costs and 
payments to MGR property holdings, that is, in the main PVH (Car) which was the Phoenix 4 
(A) plus one, who held a controlling interest in PVH and MGR property holdings (E). There 
were several historic cost transfers to subsidiary operations which were divested at market 
value, the most pronounced of which was the sale of XPart a parts business which became 
part of PVH for two pounds but which was subsequently sold to Caterpillar for its market value 
of around £31 million, again denying MGR of a valuable asset, (ibid. 761-765).2 
In December 2001 a further round of financial engineering saw PVH create an off-shore 
employee benefit trust in Guernsey (D). This type of trust is created by an employer, in this 
case PVH, in order to remunerate employees and directors in a tax efficient way. The tax 
efficiency arises as payments made by the employer are tax deductible for the employer but 
employees and directors do not incur any tax liability until the money is returned to the UK.  
Between May 2000 and April 2005 PHV paid a total of £17 million into the Guernsey Trust. In 
the main this money was distributed between the Phoenix 4 plus one other, that is, the 
employees and directors of PVH. That is, D made payments to Car or A plus one other 
person, (ibid. see: 598-608 for details).    
As the BIS report demonstrates, during 2003 and 2004 PVH continued to pay substantial 
monies into the Guernsey trust whereas some of its subsidiary operations completed the sale 
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of former MGR assets, for example MGR property holdings‟ sale of the Longbridge site. 
Similarly, MGR sold the intellectual property rights to the Rover 75 and engine technology to 
SAIC3. Throughout this period MGR was trading at a loss and reported a loss of £92 million for 
2003 in October 2004. By March 2005 Ernst and Young reported that PVH had insufficient 
cash to trade beyond the end of the month. Attempts by the DTI to broker a variety of rescue 
deals fail because of the failure of MGR to secure a joint alliance partnership with another 
auto manufacturer, and MGR went into administration in April 2005. In 2009 MGR‟s 
administrators, PWC reported that it had received up to £464 million in claims by MGR 
creditors. Having paid many previous claims at just 6%, that is, six pence in the pound, many 
creditors are foregoing huge sums of money. In July 2009 the MGR administrators had just 
over £40 million (PWC, 2009).                         
The Re-Structuring of MG Rover: Extracting Value via the PEBM    
The objective of private equity investors is to make money. As contributors to the academic 
debate demonstrate, this can be done in the main in one of two ways: either renewing the 
value of existing assets and later selling an investment as a re-listing or in the secondary 
private equity market; or alternatively investors can extract value from a business but secure it 
as a going concern, sell it via a re-listing or in the secondary market, or integrate the business 
into a larger group by way of its acquisition in a joint venture. In either case investors will 
secure returns and revenue streams for themselves as a result of financial engineering. 
The MGR case is unusual in the sense that it was not highly leveraged. That is, the Phoenix 
four (latter termed the Phoenix Consortium with the addition of a 5th person) only borrowed 
£60,000 each to secure the special purpose investment vehicle – Techtronic, which acquired 
MGR from the Phoenix 4. The debt finance effectively came from BMW via the „dowry‟ which 
may even have been interest-rate free. However, despite this, the financial engineering 
entered into by the consortium is a pure example of value extraction on the PEBM. In the 
short-term the money loaned to MGR from BMW ensured that the firm would not fail, that is, it 
had sufficient capital to pay the wage bill and keep the business as a going concern. Beyond 
this, the MGR business plan was based on a projected revenue stream derived from the sale 
of one million cars in the first five years - a figure it failed to secure by some 25% in most 
years. In simple terms this reduced operational cash flow by about 25%. The effects of this 
shortfall were threefold. Firstly, on the basis of cash flow (a key efficiency and performance 
metric for private equity operations) it reduced the profitability of the firm. Secondly and 
directly related to this, the reduced cash flow made MGR less attractive to a joint venture 
partner. This would be further reinforced if any potential joint venture partner conducted a due 
diligence exercise and realised the extent to which MGR assets (land and revenue streams 
from BMW) had been hollowed out by its owners, PVH. Thirdly, it reduced the funding 
 12 
available for new model development – critically a medium sized car which was urgently 
needed – further reducing the attractiveness of the firm to other players.     
MGR was unusual in a second sense. Whilst PVH was not necessarily backed by substantial 
leverage and whilst it rolled out the PEBM, it had considerable stakeholder support in the form 
of local MPs and the trade unions which were recognised at the Longbridge site. Because of 
this and the initial pronouncements of the Phoenix 4 which centred on a stake holding 
approach to ownership there was little opposition to or scrutiny of the manner in which PVH 
secured generous financial rewards and secured and ring-fenced MGR assets at historic cost 
before divesting itself of them at market value. In many respects it could be argued that the 
trade unions were effectively „duped‟ in a way they were not at other more controversial 
private equity buy-outs such as that at the AA. It was only after MGR‟s collapse that the GMB 
union made public its concerns about the deficits in the MGR pension fund (GMB, 2007). 
More significantly, the MGR case is unusual in a third sense. The absence of leverage and the 
„full-on‟ stakeholder support buoyed the short-term business plan to run the firm out of the 
BMW dowry-cum-loan and revenues derived from car sales, whilst the extraction of value via 
asset sales and transfers was less transparent as was the value of the financial rewards for 
PVH, for example the use of £75 million in BMW loan notes. Whilst £10 million of this was 
issued to members of PVH as interest bearing loan notes, the other £65 million was used as a 
performance bench mark for bonus payments (BIS, 2009: 754). 
The key points at issue are three-fold. One, the Phoenix four and one other individual, Mr 
Howe, who acted as the MGR managing director were the controlling members of PVH, as 
they owned all the „D‟ voting shares. Two, in effect they were able to set the level of their own 
financial remuneration and bonus payments and payments to the Guernsey trust without 
challenge. Equally, they were able to set the levels of commission and payments to subsidiary 
entities which handled and advised on the sale of MGR assets where PVH was both 
controlling owner and controlling employee. Three, in terms of corporate governance and 
financial engineering the details of this case demonstrate how financialization has changed the 
nature of competitiveness in the re-structuring of a going concern. Therein trade in the 
revenues streams and assets of a firm appear more significant than sustaining the firm as a 
going concern. In terms of the argument laid out in section 2.2, financial engineering on the 
basis of the PEBM enabled the Phoenix consortium to extract value from MGR in the form of 
salaries, benefits, bonus payments, loan notes (payable to the Phoenix 4) and contributions to 
the employee and family trust in Guernsey of around £42 million (BIS, 2009). Alongside this, 
some £35 million was paid out to advisors to PVH, bringing the total amount of money 
extracted to around £77 million (Bailey, 2009).4 In fact, the directors tried to extract more from 
the complex operations of the group. Two „projects‟ called Lisa and Patto would have been 
owned by the Four, not MG Rover. For example, Patto was an attempt to reduce the 
 13 
indebtedness to BMW of Techtronic, which would have had the effect of increasing the value 
of the Four‟s shares. This was abandoned only when BMW realised what was going on. 
 
PRIVATE EQUITY AND THE PEBM: UNREGULATED ACTORS IN A DE-REGULATED 
BUSINESS SYSTEM 
In this part of the paper we draw on some of our previous work to show how PVH‟s use of the 
PEBM demonstrates how value extraction from a going concern can be achieved in the UK 
perfectly legally. In so doing, we do not imply that all (or even the majority) of re-structuring 
efforts on the PEBM seek to extract value in a manner that may, in the absence of a strategic 
partner, run a business into the ground. Rather, this case demonstrates the limitations of 
regulation as it currently stands in the UK. We do this in two ways: first by examining how UK 
authorities have sought to regulate private equity and the PEBM and then second, by a more 
detailed evaluation of the costs of the MGR collapse for workers employed there, local 
businesses and the wider West Midlands economy.    
The Regulation of Private Equity and the PEBM in the UK        
Until 2007 private equity firms operating in the UK were in the main unregulated. Stung by 
trade union claims of social inequality and growing perceptions across the business 
community that private equity benefited from preferential tax and transparency arrangements, 
many private equity firms began responding to media and union criticism by committing 
themselves to provide the names of investors but not the details of executive remuneration. In 
many ways these moves pre-empted the attention of the House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee which examined the sector in some detail in the summer of 2007.  In January 2007 
the British Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (BVCA) proposed the creation of a 
voluntary code of conduct on reporting and transparency guidelines. In return for this the 
BVCA lobbied for a continuation of beneficial tax arrangements (termed the „tax risk‟) which 
allows income to be booked as a capital gain but at a sector wide preferential rate of only 10% 
(since April 2008 at 18%).5 In October 2007 the BVCA published the voluntary code of 
conduct hereafter termed the Walker Report (2007). This document published a series of 
voluntary guidelines and recommendations for the sector that included timely and effective 
communication with employees either directly or through a portfolio company as soon as 
confidentiality constraints are no longer applicable. Since 2007 the unfolding effects on 
workers of a free-wheeling approach to banking and finance and corporate governance 
evident in the global financial crisis and associated economic downturn have allegedly reset 
capitalism in a number of ways; not least in attitudes towards pay inequality, the emergence of 
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persistent employment insecurity and concerns over corporate transparency and 
accountability.   
However, in the UK regulation of business models that focus on investor and shareholder 
interests is still at an early stage. Private equity self regulation in the form of the Walker 
Review (2007) and reports by the associated Guide Lines Monitoring Group (GLMG) (2009) is 
the preferred route to voluntary self regulation. Notwithstanding this, the GLMG reported that a 
third of portfolio firms breached the voluntary code in 2007, many of them in the area of 
„worker relations‟ and both the GLMG and Walker Review are anyway decidedly silent on 
employment relations issues, in particular on the transfer of undertakings protection in the 
case of acquisition by private equity. More alarmingly, the EU Commissioner for internal 
markets and services now appears to favour EU wide voluntary regulation on the Walker 
model and is rowing back from a previously avowed policy of pan-European legislative 
regulation, (EP, 2008; CEMA, 2008; IUF, 2009). Similarly, in the UK, the Turner Review 
(2009) on the global banking crisis is equally silent on private equity in the shadow banking 
sector and employment issues in portfolio firms, risk management systems, disclosure and 
„whistle blowing‟ procedures for alerting management to unexpected problems and risks 
associated with complex financial instruments. This extends beyond employees in providers 
and backers of the business model to portfolio firms, particularly in the strategic use of 
pension funds or property portfolios by holding companies which support yet insulate bespoke 
investment vehicles from the branded firm they acquire.  
So at the macro level of regulation in the UK economy (and in all likelihood across the EU) the 
private equity sector and the associated PEBM remain in the main unregulated, making a 
repeat of what occurred at MGR both likely and perfectly lawful. We now move from the 
limitations of the regulatory framework for private equity in the UK to a more grounded 
discussion of the effects that re-structuring MGR on the PEBM has had on the West Midlands 
economy and the Longbridge workforce.  
The Effects of the Collapse of MGR on the Workforce and Wider Regional Economy 
Given the importance of the automotive sector to the West Midlands economy, with some 
53,000 jobs in the wider sector in 2005 (comprising 30% of the total sector in the UK and 
contributing some 6% of regional GVA; Bailey et al., 2008: 270), it was clearly evident that the 
subsequent closure of MGR could have had a significant adverse effect on the regional 
economy. Were it not for effective government intervention during the Phoenix years, under 
the auspices of the Rover Task Force (RTF, which consisted of representatives of central and 
local government, business and union organisations), helping to promote diversification away 
from a reliance on MGR by first and second-tier suppliers, then the adverse impact on the 
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region would have been greater (Thomas et al., 2008); indeed, it is argued that the work of the 
first RTF between 2000 and 2005 may have saved as many as 12,000 jobs in the supply 
chain (ibid. 361). In the event, the closure of MGR – with the loss of some 6,000 jobs – in 
February 2005 still had a significant negative impact on the region, as MGR‟s turnover 
accounted for 0.5 to 1 percent of regional GDP. It has been estimated that the closure of MGR 
had resulted in the loss of £200 million a year alone in government revenue foregone, in 
addition to multiplier effects within the supply chain (Bailey and Kobayashi, 2008).  
The second RTF convened upon closure to try and mitigate this situation, having secured 
some £176 million of government funding to further support suppliers and try and facilitate the 
adjustment of workers into emerging sectors, particularly through organising training provision 
and providing advice and assistance to those seeking work. Redundancy payments were 
made by the Redundancy Payments Directorate of the (then) DTI quicker than usual and the 
human resource function of MGR was kept on until December 2005 to assist with this. 
Employee pensions were effectively safeguarded, with the shortfall in the pension fund made 
up through the Pension Protection Fund (ibid.). In contrast to the Government‟s largely „hands 
off‟ approach to industrial policy, the targeted support manifest in the Task Force approach 
could be said to have facilitated successful adjustment by workers. Our interviews with a 
representative sample of over 200 ex-MGR workers suggested that, by April 2008 (3 years 
after closure), some 90% of ex-MGR workers had obtained employment (75% full-time) and 
further, that some 60% of ex-employees had engaged in some form of retraining or education 
(mainly for reasons of up-skilling or obtaining a qualification; Bailey et al., 2008b, De Ruyter et 
al., 2010). However, against this, it is critical to note that our survey of ex-workers found that 
the average earnings of ex-MGR workers had fallen by £5,600 in real terms, and this in itself 
concealed significant polarisation of earnings, with one third of workers having experienced a 
rise in earnings by April 2008 (ibid.). 
If anything, the relative success of a targeted approach by government at a local level to the 
closure of MGR only serves to provide a sharper contrast with the systemic problems inherent 
in the wider UK economy and the UK Government‟s lax attitude to regulation of the PEBM and 
finance in general. Yet five years on from the closure of MGR it is evident that the situation for 
many of the former workers remains fragile, with the impact of the current recession being 
particularly evident in that workers who had found jobs had been subsequently made 
redundant again, or working “three-day weeks” or otherwise working on a casual or agency 
basis (De Ruyter et al., 2010). As one worker who had subsequently obtained a job as a 
tooling manager in another company commented: 
“When I started with [Tool Co] they got me to employ more people. I took on 10 ex-MGR 
workers six months after Rover went bust - but now, of those ten, I only have three left who 
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are permanent full-time. Two others are working on-and-off as casuals, and the other five 
have all gone. 
I was going to 8 or 9 companies. Now three of them are out of business and of those that are 
left, most are on three-day weeks and have lost 40 to 50% of their workforce. It‟s carnage in 
the car industry at the moment” (ex-MGR worker, April 2009, cited in De Ruyter et al. 2010). 
 
That the current financial situation of the Phoenix Four provides a marked contrast to that of 
the ex-workforce (25% of whom were reporting being in financial difficulties in April 2008 – 
before the onset of the economic downturn) has not been lost on ex-MGR workers, with 
workers interviewed commonly expressing anger and disgust at what they saw as the 
manifest enrichment of the Phoenix Four when MGR was reporting losses, the seeming abuse 
of the worker and community goodwill manifest in supporting PVH‟s takeover of MGR in 2000, 
and the  unwillingness or inability of government to “do more” to prevent the closure (ibid). 
Revisiting the PEBM: the Need for More Regulation and Greater Transparency 
The developments surrounding the nature of the private equity takeover of MGR and its 
consequent administration by PVH only serve to reignite the debate surrounding the operation 
of the PEBM within the UK corporate environment, which in turn links to broader debates over 
the nature of regulation and systems of corporate governance. In many ways in 2010 the 
private equity sector remains an unregulated actor in the UK‟s comparatively de-regulated 
business system. If it is subject to any regulation at all, then „self regulation‟ (in the form of the 
Walker guidelines for accountability and transparency (supplemented by its best practice 
reporting body - the guide lines monitoring group), is the order of the day. This is despite 
ongoing debate and concern over the situation in the sector. Started in the UK by the 
deliberations of the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, the potential of the 
PEBM to generate huge sums for investors combined with highly preferential tax treatments 
was first revealed in 2007. However, the committee was inconclusive in its deliberations and 
whilst it did embarrass the Government into changes in the tax rate levied on private equity 
profits, it continued to allow profits to be booked as a capital gain not income. The use of off-
balance sheet instruments (so-called special purpose investment vehicles) was left largely 
unregulated; so too was the thorny issue of the transfer of undertakings legislation designed to 
protect employee interests in the case of transfer to a new employer. Private equity buy-outs 
on the PEBM are not classed as a transfer of undertakings, but merely a change of majority 
owner.  
On both issues the Treasury Select Committee argued for a pan-European evaluation of the 
sector. This eventually culminated in the EU Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive. 
However, its name suggests the Directive is primarily concerned with the activities of hedge 
and private equity fund managers - not the system itself. Therein the focus of proposed 
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regulation centres on the size of capital under management and the potential limits of the 
scale of leverage, as well as an EU-wide passport for indigenous and non EU fund managers. 
The issue of off-balance sheet investment vehicles appears likely to remain unregulated - 
even though as the MG Rover case demonstrates they can be a way into a business which 
has a considerable portfolio of intellectual and property assets. Similarly, the Directive remains 
inconclusive on the issue of transfer of undertakings after making an initial suggestion that 
transfers of ownership by the PEBM should indeed be treated as a transfer of undertaking. 
A key limitation of current approaches to regulation, whether the current position in the UK or 
the regulation of individuals – the most likely basis of EU wide regulation - is that both foci 
exclude a significant evaluation of „systematic risk‟: that is the risk which is associated with the 
failure of the PEBM in particular circumstances, specifically those associated with special 
purpose investment vehicles such as Techtronic. If, for example MG Rover had been more 
profitable not only as a mechanism to extract value but as a more traditional going concern 
then fewer individuals might have been interested in the extent to which Techtronic stripped 
the business of value. Hence it appears to us that the key regulatory issue associated with the 
PEBM is one of distribution. In the MG Rover case, what some critics might refer to as 
„managerial looting‟ is not actually so, because what occurred there and what might occur 
again elsewhere is actually lawful. The regulatory question centres on how to secure wider 
stakeholder oversight of special purpose investment vehicles without reducing the efficiency of 
such vehicles because they fail in a few cases.  
By association the public policy stance of the last UK Labour government and in all likelihood 
that of the new Conservative – Liberal Democrat coalition government appears content with 
value extraction on the basis described herein, even though in cases such as MG Rover it 
actually undermines a business as a going concern. Campaigns of opposition need 
mobilisation at ground level such as those associated with the limitations of the PEBM in 
premier league football clubs. There value extraction by the Glazer family at Manchester 
United, or Gillette and Hicks at Liverpool, and the numerous owners of Portsmouth are now 
being highlighted as potentially damaging these firms as going concerns. The next level of 
regulatory oversight is wider stakeholder oversight for example, perhaps in securing 
recognised trade unions some representation in PEBM-backed investment vehicles as distinct 
from merely union support as in the case of MG Rover. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have explored the nature of the private equity business model (PEBM) and 
assessed its shortcomings, using the highly illustrative example of the demise of MG Rover 
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(MGR). We conclude that as long as policy elites support the relatively unregulated PEBM on 
the basis of its efficiency dynamics, PEBM failures such as MG Rover will continue to occur. 
Hence, not only is the question one of regulation and transparency, but also it is one of 
distribution and the extraction of value for the minority in the case of success or failure. This is 
what we mean when we suggest that the emergence of the PEBM changes the basis of 
competitive rules in the organization and running of erstwhile going concerns. The findings of 
the BIS report which laid bare the extent of value extraction and financial engineering at MG 
Rover are now being reviewed by the Financial Reporting Council (FRRC).  
If, following the UK's 2010 general election, the new government remains committed to the 
previous Government‟s determination to “learn any lessons we can to ensure greater 
transparency about the impact of decisions which directors are making and the state of the 
companies they are running” (Lord Mandelson, in Bailey, 2009) then changes could be 
considered to auditing and accounting standards and guidance. Of particular interest, the BIS 
inspectors suggested that improvements could be made to auditing and reporting standards 
that would increase transparency in financial statements. The issue of „going concern‟ may 
also need looking at again. Whilst the report also suggests that although the transfer of assets 
and tax losses between companies with the Rover Group was in accordance with accounting 
standards, readers of the financial statements would have been better informed had the “true 
or potential value of these assets been explained” (BIS, 2009). A shift towards making such 
disclosures mandatory would improve understanding of a company‟s financial performance.  
This is turn would help with the two regulatory issues associated with the PEBM. One is to do 
with distribution, and centres on how to secure wider stakeholder oversight of special purpose 
investment vehicles without reducing the efficiency of such vehicles.  
The second issue may be instructive in this regard. The financial sector is made up of huge 
financial entities which are not easily devisable into banks of different types, hedge and 
private equity funds, re-insurers and credit default swap brokers. The institutional distinction 
between different types of banks and those institutions trading in various types of securities 
has all but disappeared to the extent that the labels are interchangeable, that is, all do all of 
the different types of trading. What is necessary to reduce the power of these institutions over 
the real economy is legislative restriction over their scope. Currently the interchangeable roles 
of branded financial institutions enable them to trade products and fund special purpose 
investment vehicles without oversight. Legislative reform is required to ensure that no UK 
bank or financial institution which contains a bank can own, invest in, or sponsor a private 
equity fund which is unrelated to serving its own customers for its own profit. This will restrict 
the trading activity of British banks in off balance sheet instruments, special purpose 
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investment vehicles or securities markets such as credit default swaps which if they result in 
distress and flight - as in the MG Rover case - are currently secured by the taxpaper.         
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Endnotes: 
1. Clark provided evidence for the Financial Services Authority review of private equity (FSA, 2006) and 
for the Treasury Select Committee in its examination of private equity in 2007. See also HCTSC, 2007 
and Clark, 2009a; 2009b. Bailey and de Ruyter have detailed the economic and social impact of the 
demise of MGR as part of an ESRC-funded investigation (Armstrong et al., 2008; Bailey and 
Kobayashi, 2008; Thomas et al., 2008; Bailey et al., 2008b; de Ruyter et al., 2010). 
2. As the BIS (2009) report makes clear, the distribution of assets and liabilities in the complex group 
structure meant that assets were allocated to non-MG Rover companies, while MG Rover was made to 
bear liabilities that should have been borne by Phoenix. Furthermore, tax losses to which MG Rover 
was entitled were transferred to Phoenix. This had the effect of increasing profits at Phoenix than would 
otherwise have been the case, and by implication the ability of the elite to extract value. 
3. Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation. 
4. The Phoenix Four plus one other manager "chose to give themselves rewards out of all proportion to 
the incomes which they had previously commanded, which were also large when compared with 
remuneration paid in other companies and which were not obviously demanded by their qualifications 
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